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2ABSTRACT
Nicaragua is undergoing a revolutionary process whereby new
institutions and popular organizations are being created to transform
and solve the problems of an underdeveloped and dependent capitalist
economy. These organizations are seen as crucial in guaranteeing a
successful transition to an equitable and democratic economic and
social system. The Sandinistas have developed an economic and
political system based on a planned mixed economy and political
pluralism where the Agrarian Refonm is seen as playing a crucial
role in the transition process.
This thesis will address the economic and political changes
which have been taking place in Nicaragua since the triumph of the
Revolution. The first part describes the development of the capitalist
mode of production in Nicaragua's agricultural sector since the turn
of the century. This is done to understand the type of economy
which the revolution has inherited and the importance of the agro-
export model which the Sandinistas are trying to transform. The
second part of the thesis focuses on the Agrarian Reform which has
been recently implemented as a strategy of economic and social
development. That section will examine the new structures which
have been created in the rural sector and the key role played
by the State and cooperative sectors. The thesis also examines
the new participatory structures now in place in many production
centers. Finally, it evaluates the achievements and drawbacks of
the first years of the Agrarian Reform.
Thesis supervisor: Lisa Peattie
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6INTRODUCTION
There is no Revolution without Agrarian Reform
There is no Agrarian Reform without Revolution.1
On July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan people lead by the Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional FSLN, overthrew one of the most
brutal dictatorships in Latin America the Somoza dynasty. The Somoza
family had come to represent since the early thirties when it was
installed by the U.S. Marines, the type of repressive government which
many dependent countries in Central America required when middle class
reforms were repressed in the early stages of economic development.
The development of a dependent capitalist mode of production in
Nicaragua had generated such injustices that by 1978 almost all social
sectors were involved in the uprising to oust the dictatorship and
change the political and economic system in favor of a more
democratic one.
Victory was achieved at a very high cost; 40,000 dead (1.5% of
the population) 80% of which were children under 18, some 100,000
wounded, 40,000 children orphaned, 200,000 families left homeless and
750,000 dependent on emergency food assistance.2 The legacy of Somoza
went far beyond the devastation and destruction of war. He left
Nicaragua an infant mortality rate higher than India's and an
illiteracy rate of 53.3%. He left a deeply depressed economy, a
neglected social service system with inadequate housing, health care,
basic services and general urban infrastructure. A special study by
the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America reported well over half
7a billion dollars in physical destruction.3 Aerial bombings by the
National Guard had left many factories destroyed or damaged. Most of
the cotton crop (80%) as well as staple food crops had gone unplanted
or been heavily damaged by neglect during the fighting. Thirty
percent of the population were without jobs. One million people,
nearly half of the population needed emergency food supplies. The
country was bankrupt for Somoza had left only 3.5 million dollars in
the Central Bank and a staggering foreign debt of 1.6 billion dollars,
one of the highest per capita debts in the world.4
For the first time in Nicaragua's history an opportunity existed
to change the economic, social and political system which had been
based on the oppression of the majority of the population. The
Government of National Reconstruction faced great problems when it
took power on July 19. Its broad goals were: strengthening self-
determination, general economic recovery and development of a truly
democratic system. Implicit in the program was a desire to improve
the standard of living and quality of life of the masses. This meant
among other things, a commitment to eradicate illiteracy, implement
an effective land reform and provide free health care. The new
government's economic plan, Plan de Reactivacion Economica, outlined
a new system to end decisively the past regime's exploitation and
corruption which had left such a wide gap between rich and poor. It
proceeded to expropriate all of Somoza's family privately owned or
controlled business in Nicaragua. The State also nationalized other
key sectors such as banking, mining and trade thus enabling the State
sector to serve as the principal manager of the new economic system.
The private sector was seen as having to play a crucial role.
8It was encouraged to move into full production as quickly as possible.
However, the private sector was as bankrupt as the rest of the country,
so the Junta nationalized the credit institutions to help guide the
production of the private sector towards the broader goals of the
revolution. It also nationalized foreign trade to control and
channel foreign exchange revenues to social development projects and
to repay the huge external debt. The government then immediately began
to extend credit to small businesses and industry to facilitate their
integration back into production. The Junta's economic team outlined
three guidelines for those receiving credit: generation of maximum
employment, utilization of domestic raw materials and minimization
of any new foreign indebtedness.5
The economic program placed great importance on the existance of
a "mixed economy" model as a transitional strategy of development
during the phase of national reconstruction. This would provide an
opportunity for private capital to cooperate with the social and
economic plans of the new government. The FSLN determined that
its control of the military forces, its social position as the van-
guard of the revolution and the weakness of the bourgeoisie could
allow for a transitional period to a new society with a new State and
economy that represented the interests of the majority. Jaime
Wheelock, Commander of the Revolution and Minister of Agrarian
Reform stated:
"Usually the most important characteristic of the
bourgeoisie is that it is armed, separated from its
people. In Nicaragua the important point is that
people are armed; the army becomes the base for
all change... "6
The Revolution is described by the FSLN as a Popular Democratic
9and Anti-imperialist meaning that society as a whole continues to
reflect a multiplicity of class interests. A pluralistic political
system has been installed where a wide array of political forces and
parties have been allowed to coexist and participate in this change.
However, it is the popular classes and the Sandinista front which
clearly hold the upper hand. The FSLN also believes in diversifying
its economic dependence with the advanced capitalist world by lessening
its total dependence on the U.S. So far it has diversified its trade
and financial relations with Western Europe, Japan, many third world
countries and the socialist countries. As is stated in numerous
billboards in Nicaragua "On July 19th we won our political independence,
now we confront an even more difficult task of winning our economic
independence."
How does a devastated and underdeveloped economy win economic
independence? By economic independence the Sandinistas have in mind
the structuring of a new economic system which can meet and address
the pressing needs of the Nicaraguan population and not foreign
interests or the international market. The important question therefore
is what conditions guarantee a successful transition from a dependent
capitalist economy based on the agro-export sector to a more advanced
economic and social system which is democratic and solves the problems
of malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, housing shortages, land
distribution, transportation infrastructure etc. The Sandinistas
have adopted an economic model based on a planned mixed economy where
an Agrarian Reform is seen as playing a crucial role both economically
and politically.
Marx had envisioned socialism growing out of contradiction between
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the forces and relations of production - transforming social relations
and building from the productive forces generalized by capital. Marx
had stated,
... no social order ever perishes before all the
productive forces for which there is room in it
have developed; and new higher relations of
production never appear before the material
conditions of their existence have matured in
the womb of the old society itself." 7
How does Nicaragua's dependent capitalist reality compare to Marx's
and Engel's philosophical conception of the historical transformation
of the capitalist mode of production? Was the FSLN ready to take that
historical step described by Marx? Clearly Nicaragua did not yet have
in its different economies the sufficient development of the productive
forces to guarantee a transition to socialism. Some of the
agricultural factories engaged in agro-exports which will later be
described, could provide a base for a transition. However, that mode
of production is not sufficiently extended throughout agriculture. It -
is the poor landless campesinos which predominate there. The problem
of transition in Nicaragua is not only underdevelopment of the
productive forces but also the destruction and pillage of the forces of
production which took place during the revolution. Faced with
political defeat, capital proceeded to massively destroy the productive
forces (lives and property) and pillage the economy (the de-
capitalization of Nicaragua and the massive foreign debt left behind
by Somoza). The FSLN now has as an important transition problem to
rebuild and reactivate the productive forces by employing unemployed
labor, reconstruct physical plants and factories, restore farm
equipment etc. It is doing so by adopting a planned mixed economy
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model where some dominant sectors of the economy have been socialized
and allowing space for the private sector to participate and help
rebuild the productive forces.
In the transition periods it has always been necessary to exert
some form of control and regulation of the "blind" laws of capitalist
mode of production. Adolfo Jose Acevedo Vogl, an FSLN theoretician
states:
"The laws of capitalism will continue to function
but in a regulated manner and within certain
limits. They will be progressively narrowed as
the new relations of production take hold and a
solid base of a new economy is created."8
The Sandinistas believe that the key for a successful transition
to a more just and equitable society lies in transforming those
relations of production that have the strongest influence in society
as a whole. In the case of Nicaragua it is in the agricultural sector
for it is there that historically capitalism established an export
base geared to the international market. It has been the agricultural
sector, as we shall see, which generated the largest percentage of
foreign exchange, employed over 60% of the economically active
population, decided the migration and land tenure patterns for the
campesinos, their nutritional base, level of culture etc.
There has been a strong bias in many revolutions to automatically
assume that only the industrial sector of the economy can guarantee
a leadership position in the transition to a higher mode of
production.9 A careful study of Nicaragua's economy shows that
industry cannot be the sole base of the transition. This is because
for the past thirty years Nicaragua's industry has been the result of
foreign capital initiatives and has been totally "disarticulated"
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from the rest of the economy. Nicaragua's industrial sector has been
described as being of a final touch or final assembly that is, it
does not process any of Nicaragua's raw materials, it only transforms
raw materials that come from the U.S. or other Central American
countries. Also the industrial sector uses obsolete technology and
the labor force it employes is small in numbers and has low technical
skills. A country whose industry depends so much on the imports from
other countries makes it extremely susceptible to economic boycotts.
All this makes it very hard for Nicaragua's industrial sector to
penetrate the international market for manufactured goods. Nicaragua
is very poor and underdeveloped and cannot unilaterally change the
laws of the international market to its favor.
The Sandinistas have focused their attention on industrializing
those products which other underdeveloped and developed countries can
and will buy because they need them. This strategy is based on
industrializing the natural resources: the mines, forestry, fisheries
and agriculture export crops. The development strategy has, therefore,
focused on the agricultural sector. The two major goals have been to
increase the production of the traditional export crops to generate
foreign exchange to meet the needs of social investments and loan and
debt repayments and to break away from a dependent agro-export model
by instituting an agrarian reform. As described by Peter Marcheti,
an expert in the field of land reform:
"Land reform in Nicaragua will transform a repressive
export economy, where there was no room for the
development of an internal market into an economy
that allows the majority of the people, first to
be producers. And the task is, really, very
simple. "10
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The agrarian reform is the first step to solve the historical
demands of the majority of the rural population: access to sufficient
land to generate income, stable employment all year round and increase
production of basic grains for domestic consumption. The agrarian
reform has two key elements to it: one has been the creation of a
People's Area Property (APP) which is composed of all the nationalized
lands which used to belong to Somoza. The APP is to serve as a
development pole for Nicaragua's agriculture. As Jaime Wheelock
states:
"The APP is the center, the axis, is that which will
allow a clear and definite rupture between the previous
mode of production and the new mode of production
which the Sandinistas want to develop... However, not
everything can be converted into APP. Only that which
encompasses a higher development of the forces of
production will be converted into a development pole."l
Another key element is that all those properties which have been
expropriated and which do not have a "higher development of the forces
of production" will be converted into cooperatives. The cooperatives
will receive large quantities of technical assistance and credit to
produce basic grains and make Nicaragua self-sufficient in food. The
goal of the cooperatives will be to gather and unify all the campesinos
who have been dispersed in different places into a "superior form of
production". Cooperatives will create a new social class of associated
campesinos thus breaking their traditional isolation. The associated
campesino will be part of a transition phase from capitalist and
pre-capitalist forms of production into a cooperative mode of
production.
The latter movement is, from a historical point of view probably
more important than the first. This is because it is more difficult
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to transform a campesino who is used to producing in isolation with
backward techniques as an individual to a cooperative campesino. In
Nicaragua it is the small and medium producers, the minifundista,
medieros and colonos who predominate in the countryside, not the
skilled agrarian worker of the capital intensive sugar mills or cotton
harvesters in APP. Jaime Wheelock has described the agrarian
strategy as follows:
"We are going to organize an APP more or less small
but a solid one with a strong base. The principal
movement will be the associative movement. With
this, we will prevent in 10 or 13 years from now
a "Polandnization" of Nicaragua. If we unite the
small property owners with backward ideologies
the result will be counterrevolution. We are
not referring to the humanitarian and revolutionary
ideas of Christianism but to the backward and
reactionary thinking that predominates among
those who are closely linked with their tiny
property. This could in the future create
serious problems in the country... Therefore,
the challenge lies in the transformation of the
individual campesino who is backward, primitive with
lack of technical and financial resources to an
associated campesino which has broken away from the
material forms of individual exploitation which can
transform him into an individual subject and potentially
a reactionary one."12
The new relations of production will incorporate a new vision of
economic development which includes the participation and say of the
different social sectors organized in mass organizations. Sergio
Ramirez, a member of the National Junta for Reconstruction, states that
"...the welfare of the people rather than profits must come first."13
This has already started to happen. There have been moves to directly
limit the profits of the middle classes. Progressive income taxes
and wage increases for the workers has begun to create a redistribution
of the wealth and income in favor of the popular sectors. For example,
some of the redistribution efforts which have already had an impact on
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the lower classes includes the slashing of rent by 50%, the expansion
of health and educational facilities in both the cities and the rural
areas. The recent literacy campaign has reduced illiteracy from 53.3%
to approximately 12% in what was and continues to be one of the most
successful literacy campaigns in the world. Daycare centers for
working women have been created and direct distribution centers in
factories and rural communities to provide basic foodstuffs at sub-
sidized rates have been established. Public transportation is now
fully subsidized. The economic plans state the objective and goal of
the revolution to be increased production while at the same time
redistribution of general income and calls for the integration and
participation of the popular organizations in the administration and
democratic planning of the economy.
This thesis will address the transitional changes which the
Nicaraguan economy is undergoing. First it begins by giving a some-
what lengthy description of the development of the capitalist mode of
production in Nicaragua's agricultural sector since the turn of the
century. The purpose of this is to understand the type of economy
which the revolution has inherited and the importance of the agro-
export model which the Sandinistas are trying to change. The second
part of the thesis will focus on the agrarian reform which has been
implemented since the triumph of the Revolution as a strategy for
breaking away from the agro-export dependent model and the under-
development. That section will examine the new structure that has been
created in the rural sector and the crucial role which the State
sector and the cooperative movement are playing in this process.
It will also analyze the new participatory structures which are now
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in place and which allows for the trade unions representing the
campesinos to have a strong input in the decision-making process
at each production site. Finally we will examine critically the
achievements and drawbacks of the first years of the agrarian reform.
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PART I
Uneven Development: The Penetration of the Capitalist Mode of
Production in Agriculture
Unlike many of the "core" countries, capitalism in Nicaragua
did not develop autonomously from within its social formation. On the
contrary, capitalism penetrated into Nicaragua as a result of the
external demand from the international capitalist market for cheap raw
materials. Thus in Nicaragua, capitalism first develops within the
agriculture sector without developing the industrial sector. The
projection of the capitalist mode of production into the industrial
sector has been a very recent phenomena and relied primarily on the
expansion of U.S. and Canadian monopoly capital in the form of
multinational corporations in the mining and forestry areas.
Throughout the different phases of the development of the
capitalist mode of production, capitalism has been unable to displace
completely pre-capitalist social formations. As a result, unequal
patterns of development between different regions has been a dominant
characteristic of the development process. By not extending uniformly,
capitalism has had a different effect on the organization of production
in several areas. For example, the different combinations of work
belonging to pre-capitalist formations like family cooperation,
communal production in Indian communities, aparceria, colonato and
medieria have been different in the Pacific coast region and the
Atlantic coast region.14 Every phase of development of the capitalist
mode of production have resulted in more pronounced regional imbalances
and the dispossession of the peasantry and Indian communities from
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their land. In this section, we will briefly describe this process
by looking at the history of the main cash export crops since the late
nineteenth century and the impact that they have had in the creation
of different class structures in the countryside.
Before 1880, Nicaragua had a weak link to the international
capitalist market. The type of agricultural production which
predominated was the traditional cattle haciendas which was the economic
base of the oligarchy. Coexisting with the oligarchy were several
forms of feudal servile social relations where small and medium sized
producers of basic grains would pay feudal rents to the oligarchy in
the form of labor services to gain access to land. Indigenous
communities had communal ownership over land and produced subsistence
crops.
With the dramatic rise in world prices for coffee during 1870,
a modernizing section of the oligarchy undertook the production of
coffee and became closely linked with the international market.
This led to the creation of a modernizing coffee bourgeoisie. The
production of coffee as a commodity created a number of difficulties,
in particular the need to secure a considerable amount of labor force
for that part of the year in which the coffee plant fruits matured.
The coffee bourgeoisie solved this by devising a system of migrant
labor made possible by a partial destruction of pre-existing forms
of subsistence activity through massive expropriations of lands
suitable for coffee production. With liberal governments installed,
legislation to privatize lands were passed. In 1877 an Agrarian
Reform Law was passed which dissolved the ejido lands. These
developments were not unique to Nicaragua; Guatemala, El Salvador,
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Honduras and Mexico also experienced similar land enclosure acts
in those years. Peasants and indigenous communities who were unable
to purchase their land parcels or found themselves without a land
title were displaced from the land.
However, these land expropriations presented a problem to the
modernizing bourgeoisie for coffee production was labor intensive.
A new system of debt peonage had to be devised by which to tie labor
to the coffee haciendas so that it would not flee to the agricultural
frontier. Thus several forms of non-capitalist social relations were
introduced: colonato and aparceria which have survived to these days
in Central American countries. Within the backward system that is
usually referred to aparceria in Central America, landlords grant
peasants or aparceros, use of the land in return for a rent often in
the form of part of the crop. Another more onerous form of labor
rent is frequently found where peasants are obliged to work various
days of the week or particular harvest months of the year in return to
small access to land.
The rising coffee bourgeoisie created tensions with the more
traditional oligarchy. This produced the context of the struggle
between the liberals and the conservatives over the subsequent thirty-
year period as well as the pretext for four U.S. military interventions
in Nicaragua. These interventions were made on behalf of the
traditional oligarchy. As a result, the reform minded coffee
entrepreneurs were never permitted to develop and thus economic and
liberal reforms were not introduced as deeply as in Guatemala, Costa
Rica and El Salvador. To this day, yield and productive structures
of Nicaragua coffee plantations lags far behind its neighbors.
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Coffee production was the first step that linked Nicaragua's
economy to the international market. In 1950, with the rise in the
world prices for cotton, cotton was introduced by the agrarian
bourgeoisie. This agro-export crop was what consolidated the
development of capitalism in agriculture. Its production increased
dramatically: whereas in 1950, coffee represented 50% of Nicaragua's
foreign exports and cotton a mere 5%. By 1955 cotton was the leading
crop and by 1967 Nicaragua was the largest exporters of cotton in
the world.15
Again, the introduction of an agro-export crop led to peasant
dispossessions. However this time they were much greater and violent
than the first. Thousands of colono and aparcero peasants were
expelled from fertile hacienda lands in the Pacific region to make
room for cotton production. These were one of the largest peasant
displacements for Latin America. As Marcheti and Deere point out:
"Whereas the development of coffee production had
been compatible with non-capitalist relations of
production interior to the haciendas and the co-
existance of subsistence production and export
production, the development of cotton production
required the clearing of the haciendas as modern
infrastructure was to be laid place." 16
What was created was a mass of landless workers who had to sell their
labor power during the three month harvest period in order to survive
for no replacement land was given. It was that period which saw the
emergence of a vast "surplus" labor force constituting the reserve
army of the unemployed.
As cotton prices began to decline in the late sixties, the new
agro-export commodity of importance became beef exporters to the U.S.
market. Again, the only logic for its production was to reap the
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profits of high international market prices. Credit was increasingly
channeled to the development of modern cattle ranches. This was a time
when Somoza's fortune increased dramatically. During the early
seventies, there was an attempt to diversify agricultural production
into commodities like poultry and pork to meet the consumption needs
of the middle classes. However, the traditional export crops still
dominated agricultural production.
Each of the three development phases of export agriculture had one
thing in common: the displacement of peasants from their lands. Also,
with each phase of development the standard of living of the rural
population decreased and basic foodstuff production imports increased.
Below are the two tables which show the distribution of rural population
by type of tenure and the relative importance of diverse forms of
tenancy in Nicaragua and Central America before the revolution. It is
striking to see in table 1 that Nicaragua had a higher percentage of
its rural population without land than the Central American average and
also a higher percentage of medium and large multifamily units. A clear
indication of how concentrated land ownership was. Table 2 shows
another striking fact, Nicaragua had a higher percentage of colonato
tenancy than Central America as a whole.
Table 1
Distribution of Rural Population by Type of Tenure (% of rural pop.)
Nicaragua Central America
landless workers 31.4 22.7
subfamily and micro-
form units 34.8 59.8
family units 18.8 12.3
medium and large multi-
family units 15.0 5.2
Total 100 100
Source: CEPAL 1973 Table 18.
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Table 2
Relative Importance of Diverse Forms of Tenancy (percentages)
Forms of Tenancy Nicaragua Central America
in property 44.8 38.6
simple renting arrangements 20.6 25.1 (16.8)a
in colonato 23.1 10.9
mixed tenure 13.7 6.4
freeholders 23.1 7.0
other 4.1 5.8
aRegional average excluding Honduras
Source: CEPAL 1973 based on agricultural census, 1960.
Each development phase strengthened the economic and political
power of the Somoza family. By controlling the State and the foreign
aid to Nicaragua, Somoza was able to amass great fortunes at the
expense of the capitalist class. This exclusion of the middle classes
from wealth that Somoza controlled was perhaps his greatest mistake -
for it eventually led to a coalition between the FSLN and the
bourgeoisie to oust Somoza from power. Here is a partial listing
of Somoza's holding:17
46 coffee farms a fishing industry
7 sugar plantations a meat packing firm
51 cattle farms a milk processing company
400 tobacco farms a cigar factory
1 gold mine a shoe factory
3 radio stations a transport line
2 airlines a port
1 bank an insurance company
1 newspaper tourist centers
In addition, he owned industries producing oil, glass, textiles,
matches, salt, ice, chemicals, jewelry, refined coffee, asbestos,
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cement, concrete, housing and aluminum products. Somoza owned 50% of
all arable land in Nicaragua, 40% of all industry and had liquid
assets worth 400 - 600 million dollars.
The concentration of land and agricultural resources in the
hands of a few, which monopolized the earnings resulting from export
production, created a stagnation in the production of basic foodstuff
production. The peasant sector was the primary producer of basic
grains. With the dispossession of many peasants and the conversion
of former grain producing land to export crops and lack of State
attention to this sector, basic grain production failed to keep
pace with population growth. By 1955, Nicaragua was importing large
quantities of food mainly from the U.S.18 The production of basic
foodstuffs such as beans, rice and corn for domestic consumption
was relegated to the worst conditions because of the privilege that
was given to the export crops in terms of better lands, financial
means, inputs, technology, communication networks and social
infrastructure. The small subsistence producers and those that
produced cereals in their minifundios were given those tasks which
the advanced capitalist sector would not undertake due to their low
profitability.
The developed capitalist mode of production coexisted with pre-
capitalist modes dominating them and taking advantage of their unequal
level of development. The pre-capitalist sector was formed by colonos,
aparceros, canteros and small craftsmen which constituted the so
called backward sector of agriculture. The "backward" sector
supported and sustained the developed capitalist mode in three
significant ways:
24
A. By producing cheap foodstuffs for the rest of the population
thus enabling capitalism to concentrate on the production of
profitable agro-export crops in the best lands.
B. By sustaining through minimum nutrition a reserve wage labor
force during the "dead season" at no expense to the capitalists
and releasing them during the seasonal harvesting of the export
commodities.
C. By organizing a whole system of exploitation whereby the products
of the small producers were sold at low established prices whereas
the inputs they needed to produce those basic foods were sold at
very high and intolerable prices and credit extended at usurious
rates.19
The pauperization of large numbers of campesinos caused by the
development of the cotton export economy had two important consequences.
On the one hand it displaced campesinos from the Pacific zone who
started migrating to the agricultural frontier in the departments of
Jinotega, Matagalpa, Nuevo Segovia, Boaco and Chontales. On the
other hand, in the year 1970-1971 campesinos started to invade and
take over those lands which they had lost as in Chinandega. The
response of the Somocistas was repression and the promotion of a
colonization plan for the agricultural frontier without a developed
infrastructure. This caused a spontaneous migration of the campesinos.
The development and expansion of the agricultural frontier was the
defensive response of the campesino to the development and expansion
of the agro-export model of development.20
The consolidation of the agro-export economy during the early
1950's and the penetration of U.S. monopoly capital in the mining
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sector and forestry sealed off the possibility for an autonomous
industrial development and the creation of a strong and somewhat
independent bourgeoisie or an organized urban proletariat. In 1978,
the economically active population (EAP) in industry constituted only
17.7% whereas the service sector accounted for 31.8% and the
agricultural sector accounted for 50.5% of EAP.21 Nicaragua's economy
during its export boom phase was marked by a sharp disintegration
between its small and dependent industrial sector and agriculture.22
Also, the labor force was increasingly exploited. Marcheti points
out:
"Between 1960 and 1975, in the mechanized modern export
sector where all the capital resources were going,
worker productivity increased 103%. But the wages
offered in that sector dropped by 10% over the same
period. Meanwhile, in the basic grain sector, you have
an absolute stagnation in yields. Production could
have been lifted by 30% simply by introducing
insecticides and fertilizers, or by moving production
of basic grains to more suitable lands."2
Both sectors were in turn highly dependent on the international
market for the purchase of their respective inputs: raw materials,
machinery, fertilizers, herbicides, new technology and so on.
Nicaragua's industrial sector was the product and creation of
the Central American Common Market established during the early
sixties by U.S. initiatives. The type of industries which were
created became known as industries of final touch for they hardly
processed any raw materials from Nicaragua. Instead, they transformed
and used materials coming from other Central American countries with
old and antiquated technology purchased from the U.S. As soon as the
Central American Common Market disintegrated in the late sixties,
Nicaragua's industries entered into a profound crisis which it still
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has not overcome. Agriculture thus emerged as the most dynamic
and modern sector in the economy.
The Pacific Region
The capitalist mode of production has had its leading pole in
the Pacific region. Historically this is were production units,
commerce and the communication infrastructure grew at the expense of
other large regions such as the Northern Region, the Central Region,
and the Atlantic Region. To this day, those latter regions still
lack appropriate productive infrastructure. This difference has
its social expression in that the most advanced capitalist relations
of production appear generalized in the Pacific region, sparse in the
North anc Central regions and only as enclaves in the extensive
Atlantic Coast region.
The best lands of the Pacific zone as well as those in the North
Central, have been almost totally used for the production of profitable
export crops such as coffee and cotton. These same crops monopolized
the use of fertilizers, insecticides, agricultural machinery and
accounted together with meat production and sugar cane production for
more than 90% of the agricultural financing in 1975.24 The base of
the capitalist mode of production in the primary sector is located
therefore in the Pacific region which also has the highest proportion
of the population. The most important branches of the Nicaraguan
economy are located there:25
98% of cotton production
93% of sugar cane production
100% of bananas for export
47% of the rice production
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85% cattle production for meats to export
100% of poultry and pork production.
This zone also has 74% of total irrigated surface, 98% of all tractors
and harvesting machinery, 97% of electricity, 65 % of paved roads,
four of the most important ports in the country and a high percentage
of mechanized transportation.26 We find, therefore, that capitalism
in agriculture dominates not only the most fertile and important
lands of the country but also the main agricultural crops planted.
Capitalism has extended itself to other regions of the country in
an uneven way and always basing itself in the production of a profitable
and sensitive commodity (woods and minerals in the Atlantic zone,
tobacco in the north) and always basing its strength in the vast
infrastructure located in the Pacific region that acts as a leverage;
extending capitalist relations but not transmitting to the backward
zones the advantages of technical progress.
Three Levels of Development in Agriculture Before the Revolution
Before the triumph of the Revolution, Nicaragua's agricultural
sector could have been divided into several levels of development.
Here we will only mention those which were relevant when the land
reform program was instituted.
In the first place, one could find in the most developed sectors
of capitalist production in Nicaragua, complex agricultural production
factories. This included the fishing industry and farms which produced
export crops such as tobacco, sugar, bananas and beef. The most salient
feature of this development level was that it employed a permanent
and highly capital intensive and had a stable relationship with the
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international market. Many of these private enterpirses received
direct investments, financing and technical assistance from U.S.
multinational corporations. Most were intimately tied to Somoza
and his close associates.
The agricultural production factories were intensive production
units which incorporated the most advanced technology and had very
high returns on investments. Modern techniques such as soil
conservation, equipment renovation, fertilizers and research into
better production methods were applied in an effort to lower
production costs and maximize profits.27 Althouah most of those
production units had been recently formed, their contribution to total
agricultural production was quite low, their importance lied in that
they embodied the most advanced capitalist relations of production
in the countryside. It was there that the most organized and stable
proletariat existed. Many of those enterprises were to pass to APP
after they were expropriated from Somoza.
At a lower stage of development were those agricultural units
whose managerial organization was more simplified than the first. At
this level we include the main export crops such as cotton, sugar,
okra and rice where large quantities of labor were employed on a
seasonal basis. The labor force in this lower level of development is
less skilled and very unstable. The concentration and use of capital
technology and agricultural techniques were less evenly distributed
among different farms hence one could find heavily mechanized cotton
fields and others which used very primitive technologies and manual
labor. Most used highly developed machinery production inputs and
cultivation techniques. The labor force had very low levels of
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education and qualifications. They were employed and thus entered
into capitalist relations of production only in the three or four
harvest months. When the harvest was over, a great percentage of the
workers were thrown back into the agrarian subsistence sectors or some
menial occupation. Most, however, remained unemployed during the
"dead season" waiting to be employed again a year later. Those who
worked did so under pre-capitalist relations and very backward
conditions of production trying to seek a living by producing basic
grains.
Most of the cotton and sugar production was carried out under
capitalist relations although there was also production of those
export crops by small producers. In the case of cotton for example,
the small producers comprised 53.3% of the total producers but only
covered a 0.6% of the total surface cultivated with cotton.28 With
sugar cane production, 94% of the 55.000 planted manzanas in 1975 were
dominated by large capitalist production.29 The commercial export
orientation of the crops produced at the lower development level
could be seen with the following statistics which showed the percentage
of total production which was destined for exports in 1975:
cotton 92%
sugar 61%
rice 28%
okra 100%
wood 47 30
The economy of those export crops was crucial because they were
the main source of foreign exchange for Nicaragua. The production
of cotton and sugar were considered the pillars of the Nicaraguan
economy during the sixties and early seventies. Cotton alone generated
more than 65% of the total agricultural earnings and received the
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greatest attention from the financial institutions. For example,
before the Revolution, 72% of the credit was allocated to large scale
production of cotton and the purchase of fertilizers, herbicides,
tractors, and other inputs.31 Cotton and sugar covered most of the
most fertile lands allocated for export crop production. Alone those
two crops employed between 267.000 and 290.000 agricultural workers.32
(Nicaragua has a population of 2.6 million.) In essence, those crops
formed the basis through which the capitalist mode of production was
spread in the rural areas for those crops required increasing amounts
of lands and inputs thus displacing many, campesinos from their lands
and converting them into wage laborers.
Another third level of development before the Revolution could be
found in the coffee plantations and cattle raising farms. Those
production units were called transitional in development because they
included a mix of traditional methods of production emobdied in pre-
capitalist modes with more modern techniques and social relations
brought about by capitalism. They tended to employ a seasonal labor
force and in some cases used advanced technology. However, there
also predominated some characteristic elements of the senorial hacienda
and its backward social relations such as patriarchial relations,
absentee landlords and low levels of mechanization or crop improvement
techniques.
Coffee latifundistas usually differed from the cotton and sugar
entrepreneurs in that they tended to act in a more traditional backward
style. Coffee production historically had been the oligarchy's while
cotton, sugar and meat that of the emergent capitalist. Coffee was up
to 1955 the export base of the oligarchy. In 1975 it still occupied an
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important place among export crops employing 100,000 workers and
covering a surface of 120,000 manzanas.33 Thus the sophistication of
the administrative skills was almost non-existent in many coffee farms.
Capitalism and its social relations of production was able to
penetrate the production of coffee in some regions leading to the
unequal development between the two coffee producing areas of Nicaragua:
the Central Pacific and the Northern region. The Northern region lacks
appropriate transportation infrastructure and agricultural techniques
due to the lack of coherent investment policy by those latifundistas.
Where capitalism was able to penetrate as in the Pacific zone,
infrastructure was more developed, and there was more modern systems
of production. The management of those coffee farms in the Pacific
zone had an advanced system of management and financement.
Finally there was the pre-capitalist sectors which were scattered
all over the country filling the spaces left by the other three levels
of development. The pre-capitalist sector was composed of small
producing campesinos who rented lands from latifundistas to produce
basic grains. The social classes in this development level included
the medieros, colonos and aparceros. They lived in extremely poor
conditions with no access to credit and suffered from very low price
controls for their products. The Agrarian Reform was to drastically
affect the future of those poor and landless campesinos. The pre-
capitalist sectors constantly reverted towards capitalism through the
channels of the market, money circulation and loans with usurious rates.
Being pushed by the capitalist sector the pre-capitalist sector
predominated in the marginal and unproductive lands not used for export
production.
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Having analyzed in detail the development of the capitalist
relations of production in agriculture, the thesis will now proceed
to analyze how the Sandinista Revolution has dramatically changed the
structure of agriculture. The next section will focus on the history
of the land reform program. It is important to keep in mind that while
the purpose of the land reform was to put an end to the social relations
it has also addressed the urgent demands for higher wages and better
living conditions for all the agrarian workers. The land reform was
also seen as a way to increase the productivity of agriculture as a
way of generating badly needed foreign exchange.
A mixed economy now exists in the agricultural sector. Mixed
economy models have not had much success in Latin American countries.
The efforts to balance capitalism and socialism have precedents of
defeatas with the National Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, Peron
in Argentina, Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Allende in Chile and more
recently Manley in Jamaica. In all cases, private capital instead
of cooperating opposed it by economic boycotts and the strength of
the international finance institutions thus eventually eroding the
social base of support of the governments and toppling them. In
Nicaragua the mixed economy model obeys to important political
and economic considerations. It is not seen as a definite and final
stage but as a transitional process to something new. This process
has a higher chance of being successful due to the increasing
strength of the popular organizations and the fact that the army is not
divorced from its people.
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Part II
The Land Reform Program
Before describing the Nicaraguan land reform program, it is
necessary to put it within the context of Latin American land reform
programs. The vast majority of the land reforms in Latin America
since the Mexcian Revolution could be characterized as reformist in
that their political and economic purposes were to strengthen the
development of capitalism in agriculture. In all cases, the purpose
of the land reforms were to mitigate some of the actue economic and
social contradictions emobdied in the development of dependent
capitalism. The only exceptions have been the Cuban, the Chilean
and more recently the Nicaraguan land reform program whose purpose
was to initiate a process of transition to socialism.
Alain de Janvry points out that in general, land reform programs
in Latin America have had an economic and political purpose where:
"The political purpose was fundamentally to further
and stabilize the social relations of capitalism
by changing the class structure in agriculture to
eliminate the landed elite from those groups controlling
the state, creating a petty bourgeoisie from among
the peasantry, and eliminating feudal forms of labor
exploitation. The economic purpose has been fundamentally
to develop the forces of production encouraging the
reorganization of precapitalist estates on a capitalist
basis, including their modernization, and transfo i ng
junker estates into medium-size commercial farms.
There were two periods of Agrarian Reforms in Latin America.
One before the 1950's and another after the emergence of surplus
labor. Before the 1950's, the scarcity of labor in many Latin American
countries hindered the development of commercial agriculture which
required plenty of cheap labor freed from the land. The great need
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then was to prevent rural labor to getting access to land as free-
holders. So most of the reforms were aimed at breaking the pre-
capitalist latifundios which monopolized the bulk of the land and
bonded labor to the estates through debt peonage and extra-economic
coercion. Thus as Lynn Ground points out, "the origins of land
reform movements during this period were found primarily in the
exercise of subjective forces by intellectual and peasant groups in
reaction to the severe social contradictions associated with the
colonato and aparceria forms of labor exploitation."35 In that period,
all of the reforms were started outside the traditional institutional
process and in some instances after violent uprisings as was the
case in Mexico (1917), Guatemala (1952), Bolivia (1952) and Venezuela
(1959).
With the emergence of surplus labor in agriculture in the late
1950's, the logic of the internal subsistence economy embodied in
colonato and aparceria was broken. This provided an objective basis
for the State to intervene and eliminate through legal reforms, the
remnants of pre-capitalist social relations. The economic purpose
of the reforms was to allow the development of capitalism in agriculture
to increase food production and agriculture export crops in order to
provide cheap food to the urban sector and foreign exchange for
industrial development. Reforms were also implemented for political
reasons. It was a time when the Cuban revolution influenced agrarian
movements in the continent and created the fear of more radical agrarian
revolutions. Also the increasing migration of the surplus labor force
to the shanty towns of the capital cities created serious political
instability in the economic and social systems. Finally, there was
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also international pressure for land reforms as a result of the
Punta del Este charter of the Organization of American States in
1960.
The land reform program of the Sandinistas has its deep roots in
Nicaragua's history. During Sandino's war of resistance against U.S.
military intervention in Nicaragua, Sandino carried out the first
land reform program in the liberated areas controlled by the Liberation
Army. Not only were the peasants organized into production cooperatives
to produce food for themselves and the Liberation Army, but also into
literacy groups to teach the peasant guerillas how to read and write.36
During the fight against the Somoza dynasty which was installed by
the U.S. Marines before they were expelled from Nicaragua by Sandino's
army, the Sandinistas actively helped organize land seizures and the
creation of various peasant trade unions.
The Sandinista agrarian reform began during the last period of
the war in the liberated areas of the North Pacific. It was there that
the first agrarian communes were created (CAS) to respond to the need
to plant basic grains. In June of 1979, it was still unclear how long
its attention to the task of food production in support of the war
effort.
Once in power, one of the first acts of the Junta for National
Reconstruction was to confiscate the property of Somoza and that of
his family members and close associates. The new government was
instantly in charge of almost 800,000 hectares as a result of the
passage of decrees number 3 and number 38.37 These confiscated lands,
represented some 23.2% of the national surface reported in farms.
These confiscations also applied to Somoza's industrial and service
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enterprises and agro-industrial enterprises which passed to the
People's Property Area (APP).
Seven days after the victory, the Nicaraguan Institute of Agrarian
Reform (INRA) was created. INRA was charged with administering the
confiscated lands and with defining the policy of the agrarian reform.
The fundamental objective of the Sandinista Agrarian Reform was
initially defined as "to change the agrarian relations of production
that maintained the low levels of productivity and a high degree of
exploitation and misery of rural workers and peasants. ,38 The
immediate task has been throughout the reconstruction process to get
the productive apparatus working both to supply foodstuffs for the
population and the export of crops that are the basis of Nicaragua's
foreign exchange.
The policy problem faced by the agrarian reform was how to modify
the relations of production and external dependency, and at the same
time assure that the agricultural sector also respond to the needs of-
the national economy. The important question which needed to be
studied was how the agrarian sector controlled by the State could be
restructured so that the production of basic foodstuff production could
be balanced with the need to keep producing export crops for foreign
exchange. Nicaragua's economy was highly depressed; economic production
was at 1965 levels and nearly half of the population needed emergency
food supplies. The provision of increased foodstuffs to urban and
rural workers and an improvement of their standard of living was one
of the immediate promises of the revolution. The new agrarian structure
also had to respond to the need to provide year round employment to
the large number of landless rural workers. Therefore, a high degree
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of flexibility was needed. As a result, large scale expropriations
have been withheld because of fear that without adequate technical
and administrative expertise, large-scale redistribution would lead to
a decline in production, especially affecting exports and the much
needed currency.
One of the important features of the Agrarian Reform Program is
that it is not based on breaking up large farms and distributing the
land in small parcels to the campesinos. Instead, large farms will
remain intact under state ownership but they will produce for the
benefit of the people as a whole and not for the wealthy few. INRA
recognizes that other attempts at agrarian reforms have redistributed
land to the campesinos only to have national production levels drop
drastically causing more hardship for the poor in the long run,
Nicaragua cannot afford a drop in production. INRA is determined
that profits will not be accumulated at the expense of the masses.
Profits will be redistributed to increase wages, invest in social
services and invest in further agricultural development.
In an interview with Father Luis Franco, coordinator of Comunal
Assessors of INRA in Leon he stated:
"We had to give land to the campesino, but if we gave
land in the traditional form of parceling out we run
a huge risk that the new smaller productive units would
decrease their production... One of the good things that
Somoza did was to concentrate large tracks of land by
cheating, stealing and murdering. But from an economic
point of view, this concentration of land is very
favorable because of their profitability is high and
allows for further mechanization. This has to be
maintained for if we subdivide the land we return
to the agrarian process of 40 years ago. "39
Father Luis Franco talks about the experience of the Mexican
Revolution and how it relates to Nicaragua:
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"The Mexican Agrarian Reform taught us several things.
In the first place, that one should not parcel out
land. The Mexican reform parceled out and did not
resolve any of the major problems. In the second
place, that one could not donate part of the land
neither by usufructo or by sales. The Mexican
reform did not allow the sale of the land but it
did allow the leasing of lands. Today, in the
Northeast of Mexico, there exists thousands and
thousands of manzanas which are hoarded by 2, 3
or 4 sehores who rent them out... This has lead
us to completely elimante the possibility of leasing."40
Based on the Mexican, Chilean and other agrarian reforms, INRA
developed an agrarian reform plan with three major thrusts (1) Agro-
INRA, (2) Unidades Estatles (UPES) comprised of the State owned lands -
approximately one million hectares in ail and (3) Pro-Campo, the
program of services to the small farm sector.
The People's Sector
A. Agro-INRA
The State area covers a territory of 1,600,000 manzanas and is 4
composed of over 2,000 production units. Area Propiedad del Pueblo
APP controls 60% of irrigated lands. The large state farms which
have an industrial processing plant on site come under the
responsibility of Agro-INRA. Because of the required investment in
equipment and the specialized management and administration needed to
maintain their highly industrialized and centralized farms, INRA has
held large units intact and manages them directly.
Agro-INRA is organized by product and includes that which in
previous sections was described as centers of advanced capitalist
development in the agricultural sector, Those include the rice mills,
livestock slaughterhouses, sugar cane and tobacco beneficios and
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canning factories. The goal of INRA in these enterprises is to
provide free health care, education and housing on State farms.
B. Unidades de Produccion Estatales Sandinistas (UPES)
The large State farms with no key processing components are
classified as UPES. The majority of the socialized lands come under
this category. Since they do not have large processing plants, they
do not have that direct link to industry which requires a different
management. The UPES are organized geographically rather than along
crop lines as Agro-INRA is. They are divided regionally into State
complexes (complejos Estatales).41
Each complejo brings together the production units, UP's or farms
of regions under a single accounting system. This is seen as a way
of breaking the sharp regional imbalances described before. A
fundamental change embodied in the People's sector concerns what
happens to the surplus produced by the State farms. Previously profits
were appropriated by a small minority and often just one person. Now,
profits are pooled and redistributed through the region on an
egalitarian basis in an effort to overcome economic disparities of
past eras. In this initial period, the surplus is being returned to
the workers in the form of higher wages. It is expected that as soon
as the standard of living is improved that an increasing share of the
surplus will be allocated to social services such as health, sanitation,
housing and education.
The creation of the People's sector represents more than a change
in the property relations, it is also the embodiment of a new democracy.
The campesinos and rural workers participate in the decisions that
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affect their own lives as well as the social distribution of the
surplus produced in the agrarian sector. Peasants are involved in
plant and farm administration through the participation of elected
delegates on committees at both the production and decision making
levels. The workers within this sector have been organized into very
active locals by the farmworkers union, Asociaci6n de Trabajadores del
Campo (ATC). The ATC is the legitimate representative of the rural
workers to the Council of State which is the highest legislative
body in Nicaragua. It plays a central role in training and mobilizing
rural workers for their increased responsibility in participatory
decision-making within the new State enterprises.
All aspects of the farm's operation are discussed jointly by ATC
and INRA. These discussions range from production goals to problems
of health and safety, production schedules, crop allocation the
incorporation of new technology etc. Most farms have regular meetings
of all the workers and administrators to further these discussions and
correct errors. Production Councils grouping together workers and
administrators from several agricultural factories within the same
manufacturing area are now being set up to review the production
goals of an entire sector. The People's sector embodies the pre-
liminary forms of workers control. The ATC sees technical training
programs as the key to more direct workers control and administration.
It is this sector that the Sandinista's conceive as the development
pole in Nicaragua for it is pivotal in breaking away from the
capitalist mode of production.
C. Pro-Campo, The Cooperative Sector
The final sector serviced by INRA is composed by small
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cooperativized farms. The land in this division is either expropriated
land that was previously under-utilized and has been turned over to the
campesinos, or privately held land which campesinos want to farm
collectively. In the past, 100,000 campesinos were forced to live by
producing in only 3% of the land. These were approximately 90% of all
producers in Nicaragua the great majority working under isolated,
individual conditions with primitive agricultural techniques.42 The
Sandinista's commitment to raising the standard of living of both the
rural and urban working classes required that they emphasize the
cooperative model of development as well giving priority to basic
grain production. This has focused State attention on means of raising
smallholder productivity and procedures for providing access to land to
landless workers to expand and diversify agricultural production.
The agrarian land reform has created what is perhaps the largest
cooperative movement in any country in the world. Previous to the
victory of the FSLN, the cooperative movement did not exist. Since
1979, 2,500 associative groups have been organized involving
approximately 80,000 campesinos.43
Two broad forms of cooperatives have now been organized: the
credit cooperatives called Cooperativas de Credito y Servicio (CCS)
and production cooperatives called Cooperativas Agricolas Sandinistas
(CAS). The CCS extends credit and technical assistance to organizations
of small and medium property owners. They purchase inputs and market
their output collectively. This access to credit and technical
assistance was seen as crucial to develop the cooperative production
sector CAS. Agricultural experts were-amazed to find that maize
production per 1 manzana averaged only 6 or 8 quintales when with
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adequate technical assistance it could be increased to 100 or 120
quintale. There had also been a strong pressure from the campesinos
who had asked INRA to provide accessible credit at reasonable rates.
In the past, many times campesinos had to pay high prices for
agricultural inputs and foodstuffs while selling their crops at
extremely low fixed prices to repay advances. Jaime Wheelock
emphasizes that:
"Organizational and productivity advances have been
made in APP, now we have to strengthen the cooperative
movement. It is this movement where the revolution
will put its greatest emphasis." 44
The CAS are composed by lands which were formerly small somocista
farms or sharecropper land. These lands technically remain in State
ownership. Campesino families have been given 99 year leases and
administer and manage the land on their own enjoying full profits from
the farms. Families have to have at least 5 to 6 hectares and live
there. The production cooperatives is viewed as the most advanced form
of the cooperative. It is based on the collective use of land,
collective labor and the collective distribution of the surplus that
is produced. It is this sector which is expected to increase in size
as a result of the recent Agrarian Reform Law passed in July 1981. The
creation of the cooperative movement has served to increase the total
land area in basic grain production at the same time that it has
provided a mechanism for the introduction and development of collective
forms of work in agriculture.
Th e organization of the production cooperatives on State and
private lands has been another important measure in dealing with the
employment problem. Many of the workers incorporated into these
cooperatives are temporary seasonal workers on State and private farms.
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By giving this group collective access to unused lands in the people's
sector, not only do these producers find employment for all the year
but their nutrition and standard of living is better through the
production of basic grains and the use of the surplus for social needs
of the community; clinics, schools, housing. Many of the campesinos
in the cooperatives were strong supporters of the FSLN before the
triumph of the revolution serving as an important social and strategic
base. Being the most exploited traditionally they now stand to gain
the most. So far they have been very supportive of the Government
that has done so much for them.
The impressive degree of organization of the rural workers and
peasants into cooperatives in just the first year of the agrarian
reform is due to the strong initiatives and creativity of the ATC. It
has been the ATC and not the State which has organized the workers and
peasants into cooperatives. Below is a table showing the number of
cooperatives and members by zone as of June 30, 1980 just one year
after the triumph of the revolution.4 5
Table 3
Number of Cooperatives and Members by Zone
June 30, 1980
CASa on CASa on Credit and Total Number of
Zone state lands private lands service coops coops members
Central 388 569 1,000 1,907 60,604
Pacific 88 210 155 453 9,905
Atlantic 25 97 30 152 3,345
Total 451 876 1,185 2,512 73,854
Percent
18 35 47 100
a Includes precoops and collective work groups
Source: CIERA (1980), based on PROCAMPO and BND reports for August 1980
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There are different types of CAS; those formed in the State's
lands usually referred as cooperatives and those formed on land rented
from the private sector called pre-cooperatives or work groups. This
heterogeneity is again the result of the very high degree of flexibility
evidenced in the Nicaraguan agrarian reform as compared with other
agrarian reform in Latin America. It was estimated that already in the
first year 70% of the total number of peasant households belonged to
cooperatives.
There are very strong incentives to be organized into cooperatives.
The ATC is assisted by the Banco Nacional de Desarollo, the National
Development Bank BND in providing credit on easy terms to the newly
formed cooperatives. Whereas CAS members pay 7% on agricultural
loans and CCS members pay 8%, nonorganized small producers pay 11%
agricultural credit while medium and large producers pay pre-war
interests of 14%.46 According to Marcheti, the total amount of credit
directed toward small and medium producers increased by over 600%
compared with the last year of Somoza's reign.47 An important
explanation as to why their credit policy to the cooperatives has
been so successful lies in the formation of a national committee for
smallholder production. This committee is composed by representatives
from BND, Pro-Campo, the ATC, the Ministry of Planning and ENABAS
(the marketing enterprise for basic grains). This ensures a rational
use of very scarce resources and the introduction of democratic and
representative planning. At the local level, represenatives from ATC,
BND and Pro-Campo approve loans thus ensuring close familiarity with
the needs and projects of local small producers.
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The Private Sector
The private sector still plays a crucial and determinant role in
Nicaragua's agriculture. The relative importance of the capitalist
sector, the smallholder cooperative sector and state sector in terms
of control of land, output and labor is shown below.
State Capitalist Smallholder and
Sector Sector Cooperative
Distribution of Land 23.2% 62.9% 13.9%
Share of Agriculture
Active Population 12% 38.1% 49.9%
Share of Volume of
Production 19% 61% 20%
Source: CIERA (1980)
The private sector not only controls the largest share of land but
also produces three fifths of the volume of the agricultural production.
The bulk of this production is exported. The State sector and small-
holder cooperative sectors are now of equal importance in the generation
of agricultural output but of less significance than the private
sector. The private sector has also been playing a crucial role in the
generation of foreign exchange for the country.
While the Sandinista State is based on the hegemony of the
popular sectors, National Reconstruction is premised on an alliance
with the national bourgeoisie. As long as the national bourgeoisie
continues to invest and meet their production targets and respon-
sibilities to the workers they have guaranteed their right to social
existance as a class in Nicaragua. The middle income capitalists
have shown up to this moment a willinqness to cooperate with the
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Sandinistas given that they have benefitted from the massive infusion of
credit to the rural sector.
Article 27 of Statutes of Rights and Guarantees of Nicaragua
summarized the basic guideline of the revolution: the right to private
property is guaranteed as long as it serves a social function. The
respect and guarantee for private property is tempered by several
important controls. One is a set of strictly enforced labor code
standards. Campesinos shall never again be forced to work under the
conditions and oppresion of former eras. Another control on the private
sector is the nationalization of foreign trade. The State is the single
purchasing agent of export crops and through predetermined prices the
private sector will receive fair but strictly regulated profits.
Probably the most severe limitations on certain groups of the
private sector has been the new Agrarian Reform Law which strictly
limits the leasing and parceling of land. A sector of the agrarian
bourgeoisie profited considerably due to the control of land rents.
Kamowitz and Thome estimated that 40% of cotton production was carried
out by capitalist farmers on rented lands. Capitalist farmers now
have to pay minimum wage.
However, there are many measures that have been designed to benefit
that sector as well. For example, a high priority is placed to
extending agricultural credit through the State controlled commercial
banking system. The Ministry of External Commerce controls and
guarantees a minimum price for export crops such as coffee, sugar,
cotton, beef and tobacco. This protects the producers from the de-
stabilizing influence of the international market price fluctuations.
The State absorbs any downward fluctuations in international prices.
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for agriculture exports but allows private producers to benefit
from upward fluctuations in international prices. At this moment
there is a Patriotic Tax of a flat 6% of all capital goods, banking
accounts and major possessions (houses, cars) also the benefits from
exports are taxed at a progressively higher rate.
Due to production and political problems with the private sector,
the Nicaraguan revolution again showed its flexibility and softened its
stance against the private sector. On March 8, 1982, The New York Times
reported that the Nicaraguan Government declared a package of capitalist
economic measures which some officials describe as the "last effort" to
persuade local private sector to participate more fully in the country's
mixed economy. The economic package enables exporters of cotton,
coffee, sugar and meat to trade their foreign exchange on the parallel
market at around 23 Cordobas to the dollar rather than at the official
rate of 10 Cordobas to the dollar. The private sector will be allowed
to use their foreign exchange income to import machinery from abroad.
Some elements of the agrarian bourgeoisie which have had their
interests affected have used their most effective weapon: economic
sabotage. The bourgeoisie like the workers can go on strike by
shutting down its plants, abandoning property, decapitalizing productive
units from their machines and inputs or refusing to plant agricultural
crops in the only time of the year when it can be done. For example,
cotton requires constant technical assistance. Large producers by
neglecting their field for only a short period of time can destroy
most of the crop. Many large producers have engaged in capital flight
from Nicaragua. It is estimated that over $200 million dollars have
48fled the country.
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Having learned from the tragic Chilean experience, the Government
of National Reconstruction decided to pass clear and precise laws in
order to control and punish any form of economic boycott manifested in
idle unproductive lands, decapitalization and political statements or
actions which threatened the national unity. In July 1981 it passed
the Agrarian Reform Law and in September a Law of National Emergency.
The Agrarian Reform Law
The need for an Agrarian Reform Law was clear: after one year
of the revolution 1.2% of the population still owned 47.1% of the land
while 30% of the rural farming population either had no land or worked
as tenant farmers.49 Given this agrarian structure there was a need
for a major transformation of the latifundios and extensive unused
properties in the hands of the oligarchy. Below is a table indicating
the different sectors which comprise the rural farming population in
Nicaragua:
Table 4
Rural Class Structure, Nicaragua 1980
Economic Active Population
Rural Class Sector in Agriculture (percent)
Large Landholders and Capitalists . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7%
Middle Income Capitalists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9%
Wealthy and Middle Income Capitalists . . . . . . . . . . 29.1%
Poor Campesino & Part-time Wage Earners . . . . . . . . . 36.5%
Full-time Agricultural Wage Earners . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5%
Seasonal Farm Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.4%
Source: Instituto Historico Centroamericano
The law will affect those properties of 1,000 manzanas or more
which lie fallow, are deficiently exploited or are given in lease.
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Also to be affected are those terrains that are not directly worked
by the owner but by the peasant in various quasi-feudal forms. Excepted
from the effects of the Reform are properties of less than 50 or 100
manzanas depending on the region. These lands will be distributed to
four basic groups of peasants: to those families who lost relatives
in the war, to those that have insufficient land to provide a sub-
sistence for a family, and to some 60,000 seasonal workers who need
land to provide the basis for an income during the eight months of
the year they are not harvesting the large estates. In the distribution
procedure of expropriated lands, the law favors cooperative holdings
rather than giving lands directly to minifundistas because the mini-
fundista system is not seen as capable of sustaining a family.
Lands will be given through Agrarian Reform titles which will
ensure the rights of dominion, possession and usurfruct of the granted
land, stipulating as well that this land cannot be sold in any form
and can be transmitted only through inheritance and used for the
attainment of agricultural development. It is prohibited to divide
land grants into parcels smaller than the size determined by the
reform law, which guarantees sufficiently large parcels for each family
to have a standard of living equal to that provided by the minimum
wage.
The Law also establishes agrarian reform zones to deal with the
specific problems of uneven development. Zone A is composed by the
departments of Managua, Masaya, Carazo, Granada, Rivas, Chinandega,
Leon, Matagalpa and Jinotega all in the Pacific zone. Zone B is
constituted by the rest of the country's departments. An important
juridical innovation of the agrarian reform is the creation of Agrarian
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Tribunals, entities charged with hearing appeals from affected parties
and resolving them. These tribunals have the purpose of speeding up
the process of affecting and assigning lands and avoiding injustices
through the non-recognition of titles or never ending appeals
proceedings. The Tribunal's judgements are final and not subject to
appeal.
Depending on the category of land, three different classes of
compensation have been divised for expropriated lands. Under the first
class expropriated owners are paid bonds for their land which they can
claim after fifteen years at four percent interest. Those in the
second class receive twenty year bonds at three percent interest.
Finally, the third class which is composed of owners who used tenancy
arrangements to exploit their workers have to wait twenty five years for
two percent interest. The latter group held large numbers of land but
represent a small fraction of the producers.
The Agrarian Reform Law seeks to benefit the poor campesino and
the seasonal farmworker who together comprise 53.9% of the rural
population. The new law will expropriate all those holdings which are
being decapitalized or not engaged in productive employment. It will
distribute land to over 100,000 campesinos while protecting the
property rights of the large landholders that are producing. In
essence, it intends to do away with pre-capitalist forms of production
and exploitation such as the farmer tenant system, by distributing
land to organized rural workers and encouraging the campesinos to form
producers cooperatives to meet the demands of the internal market
for foodstuffs.
The most important characteristic of the Agrarian Reform is that
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it is an instrument of economic liberty for the great majority of
rural workers. It has a strong democratic character in that it is
flexible in its treatment with the different social sectors in the
countryside. On the one hand, it tries to benefit the small and
medium producers by extending credit and technical assistance to them
while at the same time it tries to eliminate the backward and outdated
social relations embodied in the poor campesinos with no land, the
precaristas, arrendatarios and medieros.
There are few Agrarian Reform Laws that start by guaranteeing the
right to property ownership and then proceed to describe the exceptional
cases where property ownership will not be respected. Generally,
agrarian reform laws begin by stating their anti-latifundista character
and declaring a reduction in property size. They presuppose that
land is badly distributed and that there are few large property owners
who are not producing efficiently and many peasants without land.
In Nicaragua they have done the opposite. They have guaranteed the
rights to property to those who are producing efficiently to then
proceed and state under which conditions land will be expropriated.
The agrarian reform is therefore not only land distribution but
also the organization of a new social class composed of producer
cooperatives. As Jaime Wheelock states it, "the agrarian reform
is not made exclusively as a social movement but also as an economic
movement, as a movement of economic development."50  The Agrarian
Reform Law gives land to the poor campesinos, encourages the transfer
of unused or unproductive lands to associated campesinos in cooperatives
while allowing at the same time the coexistance of private productive
units because they work efficiently. Marcheti describes the purpose
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of the agrarian reform as follows:
"The purpose of the land reform law is to build and
strengthen the mixed economy that exists and to
guarantee that it is governed by the logic of increasing
justice for the poor. The people who are really going
to be touched by this law are absentee landlords who
rent their lands... This kind of land reform illustrates
how the Sandinistas are trying to avoid the mistakes of
bureaucratic socialism. Their principal iI to reduce
the responsibility of bureaucratic units."OI
This comes from a basic principle of the revolution that all the social
sectors have to be above everything else, united in the defense of the
Revolution against outside aggression. That is why in many instances
and circumstances the political aspect of the Agrarian Reform will
predominate over the strictly economic problem. As a Sandinista
Commander stated:
"It is important to place the Agrarian Reform within
the strategic framework in which the revolution, with
its internal social, political and economic process is
placed within a correlation of forces at an inter-
national level. U.S. imperialism is the principal
enemy of the revolution and at every moment there is
a confrontation between imperialism and the Nicaraguan
Revolution... Imperialism threatens to disru t by every
possible means the transformation process.
The greatest threat to the Nicaraguan Revolution today is not so
much the economic problems inherited from Somoza or the boycott of the
international lending institutions or the external or internal attempts
to decapitalize the economy. Although those are certainly serious
problems, the real threat lies in a military invasion to crush the
achievements of the Sandinista Revolution. This then explains the
great political importance of the Nicaraguan reform. The most important
problem is the viability of the Revolution. The economic problem has
been subordinated to the political need to defend and consolidate the
new State through a unified movement.
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The Achievements of the First Years of Agrarian Reform
What is interesting about the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform is that
the country has not experienced a drastic reduction in production. On
the contrary, with the exception of some cases, material production
has been increasing yearly. This has been due to the large support
given to the small and medium producers. The accomplishments of the
first years of the agrarian reform have undoubtedly been tremendous.
From an agricultural sector which was in total disorganization at the
end of the war period, a new agrarian structure has been created to
provide the structural mechanism for increasing rural standards of
living as well as collective work processes and participatory forms of
decision-making in the reformed sector.
A most noticeable achievement of the first year of the agrarian
reform has been the progress made in meeting the demand of the sub-
proletarians for full-time employment. INRA has given priority
attention to increasing the amount of work available to temporary
workers on the State farms during the "dead season". Data from Agro-
INRA show an increase in permanent employment of 12.5% in the tobacco
enterprises, 17% in the rice enterprises, and 31% in the sugar enter-
prises.53 Most of the increase in employment has been possible due to
the increased investments in infrastructure improvements and social
services. The Sandinistas hope that increased investments in
irrigation, in particular, will expand year-round employment by
allowing the production of basic grains on irrigated lands during the
agro-export "dead season".
Another tremendous achievement has been the huge harvest of basic
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grains which comes from the small farmers and is financed by government
credits. During decades, the repression from the Somocistas hindered
the development of basic grain production by not channeling credit to
the campesinos. Somoza protected the intermediaries who exploited
the campesinos leaving them without the necessary profits to expand
the cultivated area. The National Guard also repressed those campesinos
who tried to invade the lands of their landowners. Thus the Somocista
State mediated the relations between labor and capital reproducing in
each new cycle the conditions for the growth of the agro-export model
of development. In the past it was hunger that drove the campesinos
to the cotton and coffee harvests.
With the Revolution, government loans to small farmers jumped
from 100 million Cordobas in 1979 to 700 million in 1980.54 It is
expected that Nicaragua will soon be self-sufficient in rice, beans and
corn. This is the first step in restructuring the historic imbalance
between export production and the production of basic grains. As of
August 1980, the amount of land planted in beans was 26% greater than
in 1978 and in corn 20%.55 As a result, corn and bean production during
1980 exceeded that target in the 1980 Reactivation Plan. The greatest
production increases were secured in sorghum and rice which surpassed
the 1980 production targets by 75% and 31% respectively.
During Somoza's time, minimum wages for agricultural workers
were hardly paid. It was common to pay wages ranging from 804 to $1.70
per day of work (a work day included approximately 10 to 12 hours of
work). The compliance of minimum wage laws had been one of the
strongest demands by the ATC before the Revolution. It is now estimated
that rural wages in the first year of reform increased 60%, however,
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an inflation rate of 35-40% affected the increase in real wages. The
ATC has demanded that a fixed share of any increase in the social
surplus due to productivity increases be set aside for social in-
frastructure investments. As a result, better working conditions,
housing and sanitation exists in even privately owned properties. New
schools, clinics and policlinics have been constructed in the country-
side.
Among other social achievements is that in each production unit
there has to be a basic health and medical provision center. Many of
the shacks in which campesinos lived under inhumane conditions have
been destroyed. INRA has constructed more than 1,200 individual
housing units and 800 housing units with very small resources.56
Agricultural extension courses and literacy campaigns are continuously
carried out and child care centers are being promoted in enterprises
of APP. The ATC has even established rural supply centers Centros de
Abastecimiento Rural (CAR) to supply basic goods to State farm workers
at low prices. By mid 1980 there were 60 in operation. The goal was
to increase them to 360 by 1981.57
Before marketing was handled by price gouging middlemen. After
the revolution the state created a new organization called the basic
grains marketing enterprise ENABAS. Its role has been to offer food
subsidies to both urban consumers and peasants ENABAS has been able,
through some of the earnings from export crops, to set subsidy prices
that give incentives to the peasants to produce more grain and reduce
the mark-ups to consumers. Instead of buying from an exploiting middle-
man, a local grocer can now buy directly from ENABAS. This mechanism
has stopped and served as a brake to prevent the type of breakneck
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inflation which took place during the transition process in Chile.
As a result of the redistributive impact of the agrarian policies,
food consumption has increased significantly. It is estimated that the
internal consumption of wage goods increased by 29% in 1980. It is
expected that the 1980 production of basic grains will be sufficient
to cover the 1981 internal demand. Wheat and flour will continue to be
imported since Nicaragua does not produce wheat.
It is interesting to point out that with the restructuring of
Nicaragua's agricultural sector that only the export crops failed to
meet the targeted acreage levels in the 1980 plans. Cotton plantings
fell short 21% and the amount of land in coffee production was 4% less
than expected.58 The shortfall in coffee acreage was largely due to
the impact of the coffee rust. The reduction in the cotton plantings
is the reflection of the tensions in Nicaragua's mixed economy.
Nonetheless, yields on lands planted to cotton were higher than expected
and cotton production met the 1980 output target. Even so, cotton
exports in 1980 were only 15% of the 1978 level. 59
Together with the effort to diversify agricultural production the
government and the ATC have engaged in popular mobilization campaigns
to introduce appropriate technologies in the countryside. In the past,
thirty to forty percent of the basic grain crop was lost in the post
harvest period because of poor storage facilities. Marcheti describes
how the government organized a campaign to change that:
"The government has launched a popular campaign in which
they train 500 peasant leaders to make rat proof corn
cribs, and corn cribs that allow more rapid drying and
better preservation... Those 500 people went out and
taught ten people each and now there are 5,000 people who
know how to make those corn cribs. That's what we mean
by popular mobilization toward appropriate technology."60
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Another significant advance has been the introduction of modern
administration and financial methods to APP. Before the Revolution
these properties were bankrupt and had serious organizational, financial
and inventory problems. The introduction of administrative planning
in each enterprise according to regional economic plans has allowed for
a better coordination of production, financial efficiency and increased
production. New accouting, quality control and statistical techniques
called Sistema Unico de Control were introduced. Its purpose is to
detect production and efficiency shortcomings. It includes a cost
accounting method, project design and evaluation and careful inventory-
ing. This has had clear results: in the first year APP planted 1,500
manzanas in 1980 it increased to 22,000 and in 1981 to 27,000. INRA
and ATC are planning to expand this to 30,000 in 1982.61 The State
sector is expected to expand gradually and in select areas in the crop
year 1980-1981 over 1979-1980. Below are some charts which indicate
the expected results:
Table 5
State Produced Products for Exports
estimated percentages
79-80 80-81
Coffee 12.5 14.76
Cotton 4.62 15.85
Sugar 43.67 42.6
Tobacco 49.78 90.67
Meat Packing 55.00 55.00
Source: INRA
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Table 6
State Produced Food Crops for Internal Consumption
(80-81 estimated INRA %)
Rice 32.59
Beans 3.80
Corn 16.90
Wheat 41.43
INRA has tried to improve the planning and control mechanisms
by increasing the participation of workers in the enterprises and
strengthening the role of the ATC in decision-making processes. Both
INRA and ATC see the effective participation of workers in the manage-
ment of the State enterprises as a long term process which is determined
by training, education and political education. The ATC considers the
national literacy crusade which reduced illiteracy rates in the rural
areas considerably, as the first step.
Problems of the Transition Phase
The economic situation in Nicaragua is very critical. The massive
foreign debt which was inherited from Somoza now has to be repaid. This
is exerting a strong pressure on the economy. The service of the debt
leaves almost no money to buy medicines, fertilizers, tractors etc.
This problem is aggravated since the international market prices of
the export crops have been falling offsetting any production increases.
While the price of imported oil and machineries have been increasing.
As Daniel Ortega explained in his speech to the United Nations, 47%
more cotton was required to buy one tractor in 1981 than in 1977; or
54% more sugar or 145% more coffee.62 Nicaragua is also immersed in a
region plagued with economic and political problems. Many of the
countries it depends on for raw materials are undergoing an acute
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crisis themselves.
The foreign assistance required for reactivation of the economy
has not been forthcoming in sufficient volume. The U.S. government
has proceeded to cancel economic aid and needed food imports for
Nicaragua. It has instead engaged in an active campaign to overthrow
the Sandinista regime. Nineteen million dollars have been allocated to
the CIA to sabotage what little infrastructure factories agricultural
machinery and bridges which have remained after the devasting war.
The U.S. is also sponsoring military training camps for exiled National
Guardmen who speak openly about invading Nicaragua. A massive military
buildup has taken place in Hondura and counterrevolutionary bands
stationed there invade Nicaraguan territory in an effort to create a
chaotic political and economic climate. This has forced the Sandinistas
to spend what little resources they have in defense of the country.
The vast expansion of the State investment in social infrastructure
and services as well as accelerated expansion of credit have led to
monetary and fiscal expansion causing inflationary pressures in the
economy. Most of the private sector is supportive of the FSLN. How-
ever, some private entrepreneurs who control important and key
industries are decapitalizing and carrying an economic boycott worsening
the economic situation. It is no wonder that high FSLN officials
stated that:
"The greatest fight right now is not so much to
improve the standard of living of the worker
but to assure that those conditions do not
deteriorate even further." 6 3
Productivity has remained low (labor problems were estimated to
have cost $100 million in 1981), unemployment and inflation, which had
bottomed out at 18% and 25% respectively by 1980, both begun to rise
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again; state bureaucracy growth had mushroomed from 33,000 to 61,000
employees. Reserves had hit rockbottom and it was pratically impossible
to generate any internal surplus without resorting to more foreign
aid. The struggle to maintain levels of productivity and profitability
in both the agricultural and industrial sector are immense. It is here
that we find ourselves at the nerve center of all the problems
associated with the transition to a new economy in Nicaragua. The
economic gains of the rural masses and the strengthening political
power of the working class has created a situation in which the export
model per se has come under fire. Although basic grain production has
increased, the production of export crops particularly cotton remain
far below pre-revolutionary levels.
Given the extreme need for foreign exchange it might be useful
to study the possibility of achieving higher levels of basic grain
production and exporting it to other Central American countries.
The Sandinistas would like Nicaragua to become a supply grainery for
Mexico, Venezuela, Central America and the Carribean at a time when
those countries internal markets are not producing enought. This sector
so heavily repressed by Somoza, may prove to be the most dynamic element
of future growth and an essential element of a rupture with the past
agro-export model. For this potential to be fully realized the
Sandinistas will have to correct some of the drawbacks which has taken
place in the cooperative sector.
There are several indicators which point to the possibility that
the advances of the poor campesinos might disappear in the future unless
careful policies are adopted promptly.. On the first place, it seems
that during the first year of the agrarian reform the rich campesinos
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took more advantage of the vast flow of credit than the poorer
campesinos. This was due to the lack of interest rate payment
differentials among different types of small producers. In an area
where social class determines the.quality of information on credit
policy and its distribution, the rich peasants (small coffee producers)
obtained six times more credit per family than the poor arendatario
campesinos producing basic grains.64 Among the arendatarios, those
which had previous crop planting experience obtained twice as much
credit as those who were planting for the first time. The reason for
a vague policy with respect to interest rates and differential prices
for different social classes is due to the tactical alliance with the
middle classes and this might be one of the clearest difficulties
of the agrarian reform.
The task of rapidly reactivating the economy has not allowed
sufficient time to define and formulate an appropriate technological
package aimed at lessening external dependence. The results thus
far has been that in general, expansion of credit has created the
problem of encouraging the type of technology that do not meet the
needs of the poor campesinos. This has increased the dependence on
U.S. technology. Also in some regions the extension of credit was
greater than in others, or it was far superior to the economic
potential of the land resulting in some campesino families becoming
indebted. The question which worries some officials is whether loans
will be repayed. Since much of the extended credit was not tied to the
purchase of agricultural inputs. There were large numbers of landless
poor in the Pacific Region who used the credit to increase consumption
levels and thus there standards of living.65 The repayment issue has
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generated a strong debate between ATC and the National Development
Bank.
The temporary and rapid increase in the standard of living of
many campesinos coppled with reduced labor migration from Honduras and
El Salvador have produced a serious labor shortage during the harvest
season particularly in private farms. Previous to the triumph of the
revolution, the agro-export model, as we saw, was based on the
extraction of a high rate of profit. This was due to the maintenance
of a cheap temporary labor force. The rural labor reserve was made up
of rural workers and peasants without sufficient access to land and
credit to meet the minimum subsistence requirements. They were forced
to work in the agro-export sector of the economy. However, the
revolution has changed all this, with new lands and credit distributed
in favor of that social class the incentive to work at private lands
has decreased. Also workers prefer to work in APP where social
investment is carried out to benefit the workers and where they have
a say in the management and decision-making at work or try to form a
cooperative of their own.
Besides increases in the standard of living in rural areas, a
related problem that has affected labor shortage situation has been the
increases in class attendance for children. All of this has forced
the government to create volunteer work brigades from the cities
to engage in voluntary work during the cotton and coffee harvests.
The productivity of this labor is usually low but it also serves a
clear political purpose of solidarity and unity between the rural and
urban social sectors. As a result of these voluntary work programs
there has been a hightened consciousness on the part of the city
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dwellers about the harsh living conditions of the campesinos and the
importance of foreign exchange for the revolution.
Finally, the expansion of basic grain production advanced at a
much faster rate than the improvement of the marketing channels. This
also contributed to increased indebtedness of the campesinos. This
problem was most severe in the agricultural frontier region where the
lack of roads, transportation facilities and markets made it extremely
hard to market the goods which campesinos had produced thanks to
the allocated credit. In general the enormous flow of credit and the
incentives given to the production of basic grains resulted in a
sizeable increase in the currency in circulation. This caused
inflationary pressures on agricultural inputs and basic foods. Much
of what the campesinos gained in credit was later lost by increased
inflation.
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CONCLUSION
With the land reform program and the recently passed Agrarian
Reform Law, the Sandinistas have been able in a short period of time
to start undoing the historic knot of the agro-export sector which had
hindered the development of the internal productive forces and basic
grain consumption. A new transitional period has been created based on
a mixed economy and a pluralistic and democratic society. The creation
of the APP and the cooperative movement has started to solve the
traditional problems of unemployment, malnutrition, illiteracy, low
wages and participation of the producers in society. The transition
to a new society has encountered many problems due to the destroyed
and underdeveloped infrastructure of the inherited economy and the
international aggressions from neighboring countries and the U.S.
However, the revolution with its great flexibility and support from
the people has in a very short period of time drastically changed the
old structures and has begun to replace them.
The distribution of nationalized land to smallholders in the
form of cooperatives has almost done away with the pre-capitalist mode
of production and created a new rural class composed by associated
producers. This has been followed with massive infusion of credit
and technical assistance to the cooperative sector. The results have
been incredible: Nicaragua is now almost self sufficient in the
production of basic crops, commodities which it previously imported.
In a few years, Nicaragua will be exporting basic crops to other
Central American countries. This could serve as an example to many
other underdeveloped countries whose domestic food production is low
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or nonexistent due to existing land tenure structures or government
credit policies and priorities.
The U.S. food embargo on Nicaragua forced the Government of
National Reconstruction to conceive of a national emergency nutrition
plan to reactivate the production of beans, rice and maize. That act
by the U.S. prompted the Sandinistas to act with greater speed. As
Alejandro Bendana, Nicaragua's alternate Ambassador to the United
Nations stated,
"As a result of the U.S. government decision to cut PL-41
program through which we received wheat imports to produce
bread, we suddenly discovered that we had a culture based
on maize which we had ignored because of the created
dependency on the U.S. From now on, ins ead of eating
"Wonder Bread" we shall eat tortillas."6A
Nicaragua was fortunate to have been prepared politically to face and
counteract to such a move. The willingness of the U.S. government and
other major economic and political powers to use hunger and food as a
political weapon should serve as a lesson to other countries. This
was not the first time that the government of the U.S. had used this
weapon. The example of Nicaragua will be very important to other
countries which are trying to become politically and economically
independent.
The problems of transition in underdeveloped countries are very
complex. All the measures adopted in Nicaragua by the government
eventually ended up questioning the traditional and dependent agro-
export sector. This sector is still seen as crucial for it generates
the foreign exchange needed to pay back the loans, extend credit, build
schools, clinics and other social services. The problems with re-
activating the agro-export sector have been serious: increased wages
for rural workers, their right to organize into unions, the land
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distribution program and the massive investment in the social wage
has kept the migration of workers to the agro-export sector of the
economy limited. Workers are no longer driven by hunger to work in
those fields. To meet these labor shortages, the government has
instituted volunteer brigades of urban dwellers to work during the
harvest season of coffee and cotton. These work groups have not been
very productive but have served as a medium for raising the conscious-
ness and awareness of the urban sectors to the problems of rural under-
development. In many ways, these volunteer work groups have served to
break down the barriers between the cities and the countryside.
Control over land is no longer the pressing issue of development.
That problem is being solved with the recent Agrarian Reform Law. The
issue of control over labor is now central to many of the problems of
the agro-export sector. The absorption of labor into the production of
basic grains instantly increased the power of the working class in the
labor market. The workers can during this period, decrease their
productivity per hour without fear of loosing their jobs. The
increasing employment opportunities in APP and the wage increases during
periods not corresponding to the harvest season of coffee and cotton
are factors which have determined why campesinos do not go to those
harvests and why labor productivity can be so low.
Given the economic boycott organized by the private sector in the
agro-export economy, the Sandinistas will be faced with complicated
political decisions to make: how long can the revolution tolerate this
economic and political disruption? The initial agreement between the
FSLN and the bourgeoisie had been that the FSLN would guarantee their
right to existance as a class as long as they were engaged in active
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production and did not sabotage the economy. This agreement has been
violated consistently and several emergency measures have not been
able to change this attitude. With a strong need for foreign exchange
income, if the private sector continues not to cooperate then its
economic power, namely control over private land will have to be
terminated by expropriation.
Before breaking away from a model of mixed economy, the Sandinistas
have to prepare themselves for the administration and production of
the expropriated lands. They should secure the strength of the
recently established cooperative movement. The cooperative movement
will be able to provide basic foodstuffs to the Nicaraguan population
thus decreasing external dependency. It might even be able to generate
foreign exchange revenues replacing any temporary loss from the agro-
export sector. The importance of the cooperative sector lies in
providing the rural population the opportunity to experience
collective forms of management and decision-making at a small scale,
familiarity with credit usage and policies, and social infrastructure
planning. All this experience will be necessary to administer and
control the would be expropriated lands. At this point in time, neither
the FSLN nor the ATC possess sufficient technical expertise to
administer more expropriated lands.
To solve the problems which have recently affected the cooperative
movement, it will be necessary to impose the marketing channels of
ENABAS so that the campesinos can receive sufficient income from the
sale of part of the food production with which to pay back their
loans. This should be a strong priority of the Sandinista policy-
makers since efficient use of scarce capital will not take place if
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corrective measures are not quickly implemented. Also, the BND will
have to be more selective with its credit policy so as not to generate
further inflationary pressures. Better censuses and studies of
Nicaragua's rural structure have to be obtained for each region in
order to insure that credit is being used for efficient production
in the newly distributed lands. All of these efforts should be
coppled with increased technical assistance from UPE administrators
(who manage and are responsible for larger volumes of credit, fiscal
management and decision-making) agronomists, technicians from the
planning ministry as well as the affected mass organizations.
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that it is impossible
in Latin America to solve rural poverty and underdevelopment without
a considerable participation at all levels of decision-making of the
most exploited, in the creation of new production models and policies
which meet their needs. In order to set up organizations and new
economic and social structures aimed at abolishing underdevelopment
the Nicaraguan people had to struggle and win a revolution; a military
and political victory over their oppressors. Once in control of the
State and having destroyed the repressive National Guard the people
were ready to start their own transition process to a new more
equitable and democratic society. The basis for all the change has
been that the people play a fundamental role in the political and
economic process and - the army is not divorced from the people.
Today the participation of campesinos is massive. This
participation takes place at different levels of the economy and in
different ways: through their union organization at the ATC they
participate in the administration of APP units, they also participate
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through UNAG in the distribution and allocation of food in the local
markets. They participate in establishing national policies and
agricultural policies through their effective participation in the
Council of State. Finally they participate at a regional and local
level evaluating and implementing policies.
The FSLN has had the advantage of learning and assimilating the
experiences of other transformation processes. It has been very
flexible and has responded with incredible creativity to the needs of
the campesinos. In essence, their influence and support of the masses
is an important factor which explains the success of the Agrarian
Reform Program.
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